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Allocation of Carbon Emission Certificates in the Power 
Sector 
How generators profit from grandfathered rights 
Kim Keats Martinez and Karsten Neuhoff1 
September 2004 
To meet its Kyoto requirements, the EU will establish an internal market for carbon dioxide 
allowances from 2005, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).  National governments are 
to allocate most of these allowances for free.  The analysis shows that as a result the net 
value of both a typical pulverised coal-fired (PC) power station and a more modern gas-fired 
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) will increase.  We show that in future allocation rounds a 
greater proportion of allowances can and should be auctioned. The paper also analyses the 
interactions with the Large Combustion Plant Directive, which limits SO2 and NOx emissions. 
1 Introduction 
In an effort to meet its Kyoto requirements, the EU will be establishing an internal market for 
carbon dioxide allowances from 2005, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).  This 
system will be based on the cap-and-trade model following successful experience with 
similar programmes for SO2 and NOx emissions in the US (Ellerman et al.  2000).  Emission 
allowances will be allocated to participating installations in line with national Kyoto 
commitments.  National governments have been given the responsibility of deciding how to 
organise the distribution of allowances amongst the market participants which will include 
power, ceramics, metal, paper and cement industries plus any other large combustion plant 
with a rated thermal capacity greater than 20MW.   
In Section 2 we assess the impact of allowances and carbon prices on two representative 
power market participants in the UK – the standard UK base load pulverised coal-fired (PC) 
power station and a more modern gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT).  For this we 
simulate the dispatch of the UK power system using a long-term dispatch model, the 
Integrated Planning Model (IPM®).  This allows us to draw some initial conclusions about the 
nature of over-compensation of freely distributed allowances.  In Section 3 we examine 
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issues that can arise when the baseline emissions period has to be updated.  Section 4 
examines the interaction between SO2/NOx and CO2 emissions controls and in Section 5 we 
return to our issue of over-allocation and attempt to quantify this in the context of the UK 
power system. 
2 Coal and Gas in a Carbon Constrained 
Environment 
In the presence of emission certificates, fossil fuel generators will add the opportunity cost of 
emission certificates to their fuel costs to determine their marginal operating costs as 
illustrated in Table 1.  Because emission rights can be freely traded, firms have the option to 
sell the allowances if the marginal cost of production and carbon dioxide exceeds the 
electricity price.  In Section 3 we explore how the opportunity cost is affected by the manner 
in which emissions allowances are made available to market participants.  Otherwise we 
assume that the opportunity cost of allowances will be equal to the price of the allowances 
and that no banking or borrowing is allowed. 
Table 1: Comparing marginal costs of coal and gas-fired plant 
 Pulverised coal plant Gas-fired CCGT plant 
Thermal efficiency (net HHV) 35% 50% 
Fuel price (£/MMBTu) 1.20 2.30 
Fuel cost (£/MWh) 11.70 15.70 
VOM (£/MWh) 4.00 2.00 
SRMC with out CO2 (£/MWh) 15.70 17.70 
CO2 emissions (tCO2/MWh) 930 366 
Allowance price (£/tCO2) 6.70 6.70 
Allowance cost (£/MWh) 6.20 2.44 
SRMC with CO2 (£/MWh) 21.90 20.13 
Table 1 illustrates a typical merit order with PC plant achieving lower marginal costs than a 
CCGT plant in the absence of emission certificates.  This situation changes in a carbon 
constrained world.  With CO2 allowances trading at €10/tCO2 (£6.7/tCO2), the CCGT has 
lower marginal costs than the PC plant.  This is due to the lower efficiency of the PC plant 
and the higher carbon content per unit of energy in coal relative to gas.  Therefore, the PC 
plant will move down the merit order and run less relative to the unconstrained case. 
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Industry representatives frequently argue that higher marginal costs arising from carbon 
constraints will not feed through into higher product prices.2 These arguments can be 
summarised under three headings, unfortunately none of these bear scrutiny in the case of 
electricity generation: 
· International competition: Faced with viable international competition, companies 
impacted by carbon legislation would not be able to increase their prices as 
consumers would otherwise shift to imports from jurisdictions not impacted by the 
new legislation.  However, this is less of an issue for electricity because the 
European Union and Accession Countries could satisfy less than 1% of demand with 
imports from North Africa, Ukraine and Belarus.   
· Price elasticity of demand: If consumers were price sensitive, this would limit the 
ability of electricity producers to pass costs through.  However, short-term demand 
elasticity for electricity is extremely low, and in the medium term higher electricity 
prices tend to have a greater impact on capacity investment than electricity utilisation 
by consumers. 
· Free allocation of allowances: Under present plans a significant proportion of the 
carbon allowance requirements will be allocated to market participants for free.  If 
costs have not increased, the argument goes, prices should not be affected.  This 
fails to recognise the fact that freely allocated allowances have an opportunity cost 
equal to the revenue that would have been earned by selling them.   
What are the implications of emission certificates on the profitability of the core thermal 
power stations, CCGT and PC plant? The effect of the emission certificates on profitability of 
the coal-fired power plant depends on the generation mix.  However, using Table 1 as a 
guide, we can differentiate between three different scenarios each of which is present at 
different demand periods: 
· First, during low demand periods the output of a PC plant, which would have been 
marginal, will now be provided by a CCGT.  This change will be revenue neutral for 
the PC plant since at such times prices would be expected to only cover marginal 
production costs making such generators indifferent between generating and not 
generating.   
                                                 
2 If wholesale market prices are regulated, as in parts of the US, then the regulator is unlikely to allow Utilities to pass through 
opportunity costs, and hence the subsequent argument would not apply. (See Burtraw e.a. 2002) 
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· Second, the effect of the carbon constraint during periods of medium demand means 
that PC plant will replace CCGT plant at the margin.  During these periods prices 
would have exceeded the marginal costs of the PC plant, but in a carbon-constrained 
world the PC plant will be marginal, and no longer enjoy such benefit.   
· Third, during the highest demand periods, the PC plant was and can be expected to 
remain infra-marginal.  Typically the marginal plant will be an older fossil fuel plant 
characterised by lower efficiency and higher CO2 emission intensity.  Emission 
allowances will increase the marginal cost of such a plant by more than our reference 
PC plant.  Therefore, by increasing the electricity price, the PC plant can expect to 
increase the level of compensation received. 
In contrast to the PC plant the CCGT will profit from the introduction of emission certificates, 
even if they are auctioned, as can be seen by evaluating the possible scenarios: 
· At low demand times, our merchant CCGT would not have been operating and will 
now be operating at the margin resulting in a zero change of net profits.   
· In medium demand periods, the CCGT was marginal and is now infra-marginal, 
resulting in an increase in profitability.   
· At times of high demand, the effect of the CO2 allowances will be to increase the 
marginal costs of the higher cost marginal units by more than the cost increase 
incurred by the CCGT unit, once again increasing net profits of the CCGT.   
The effects can be summarised using the average price duration curve, shown in Figure 1.  
The marginal cost curve can be used to derive the marginal price as function of demand p(q).  
A typical representation of the load profile of a country is the load duration curve q(t) which 
gives the number of hours t in a year during which demand is bigger or equal to q.  
Combining the marginal cost curve and the load duration curve we can construct the 
marginal price duration curve p(t), which depicts the number of hours in a year during which 
the price is at least p(t).  A competitive generator will produce whenever the price matches or 
exceeds his marginal costs, MC.  p(T)=MC therefore characterises the numbers of hours a 
year T a generator will be producing.   
The average price the generator obtains for his output will vary between p(0) and p(T).  For 
the calculation of the annual revenue only the effective price P(T) received by a generator 
producing during the T highest priced hours of a year matters.  We can calculate P(T) as the 
average of p(t) for 0£t£T.  The average price duration curve is depicted in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1: Average Price Duration Curve with and without CO2 emission costs 
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The introduction of carbon certificates will have three effects.  The emission certificates 
increase the opportunity cost (or real cost in the case of auctioning) of production (A).  The 
increase in marginal costs shifts the effective price duration curve upwards (B).  The change 
of marginal production costs changes the merit order and therefore the number of hours the 
generator is producing per year (C).   
2.1 Simulation modelling  
Burtraw et.al.  (2002) applied an investment planning model to the US electricity system and 
calculated the effects of Grandfathering and auctioning on the asset values.  The authors 
argue that regulated utilities under cost-plus tariff regimes cannot include the opportunity 
costs of emission certificates in their cost base.  They also calculate the impact on price if 
generation companies compete in liberalised markets and hence can include opportunity 
costs.  Given that this is the case across most of Europe, under either auction or 
Grandfathering allocation systems, one expects opportunity costs to be passed though.   
To assess the impact on the power sector, we propose to compare and quantify the impact 
on annual remuneration in the period 2008-2012 across three different emission allocation 
scenarios:   
· Business-as-usual approach without CO2 constraints (BAU); 
· Auctioning of all emission certificates by the Government (Auctioning); 
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· Grandfathering of emission allowances based on the emission levels in 1999-2002 
(Grandfathering). 
To support the numerical analysis we have used a dispatch model of the UK power system.  
The Integrated Planning Model (IPM®)3 is a proprietary model that uses a linear 
programming formulation to select investment options and to dispatch generating and load 
management resources to meet overall electric demand today and on an ongoing basis over 
the chosen planning horizon.  In modelling the impact of NOx and SO2 policies, we assume 
that the UK will adopt the cap-and-trade option in the Large Combustion Plant Directive4 
(LCPD) in line with the National Emission Reduction Plan (NERP) presented to the European 
Commission (EC) for approval at the end of November 2003.   
The Business-As-Usual (BAU) case is modelled without CO2 constraints.  The carbon-
constraints run includes a price of emission allowances of €10/tC02.  Furthermore, we keep 
the resulting capacity expansion path from the BAU fixed until 2012.  The impact on the 
electricity prices will be the same under auctioning and Grandfathering allocations.  With 
CO2 allowance prices of €10/tC02, prices rise by £4.2/MWh in 2005-2007 and £3.1/MWh in 
the period 2008-2012 relative to the BAU case. 
2.2 Allocation by auction alone 
Table 2 illustrates the impact on sales and costs from a system where all emissions 
allowances must be purchased.  For our reference CCGT plant, increased electricity prices 
and additional running hours increase sales revenues from 131£/kWyr to 164£/kWyr.  On the 
cost side, additional generation increases fuel costs from 96£/kWyr to 107£/kWyr.  Since 
operating and maintenance costs remain unchanged, sales margins increase from 35£/kWyr 
in the BAU to 58£/kWyr under the auctioning allocation scheme.  With estimated annual 
emission of 1.4 million tCO2, the associated cost of CO2 emission allowances would be 
18£/kWyr, less than the extra margin achieved on energy sales.   
                                                 
3 ICF Consulting 
4 LCPD, 2001/80/EC 
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Table 2: Net cashflow impact with auctioned emission rights (2008-2012) 
Pulverised coal plant Gas-fired CCGT plant All figures in £/kWyr  
BAU €10/tCO2 Change BAU €10/tCO2 Change 
(1) Energy sales 
revenue 
117.8 134.9 17.1 131.1 164.5 33.4 
(2) Fuel expense 70.8 69.9 -0.9 95.9 106.8 11.0 
(3) O&M expense 33.1 33.1 0.0 21.7 21.7 0.0 
(4=1-2-3) Energy sales 
margin 
13.8 31.9 18.1 13.5 35.9 22.4 
(5) Net purchases of 
CO2 allowances 
0.0 33.1 33.1 0.0 17.5 17.5 
(6=4-5) Operating 
margin 
13.8 -1.2 -15.1 13.5 18.4 4.9 
(7) Scarcity rent 13.7 13.7 0.0 13.7 13.7 0.0 
(8=7+6) Total margin 27.5 12.4 -15.1 27.2 32.0 4.9 
For our representative PC plant, the price increase results in an increase in sales revenue 
from 118£/kWyr to 135£/kWyr; an increase in the average realized price for energy sold is 
offset somewhat by a drop in generation.  Slightly lower production means lower fuel costs, 
down from 71£/kWyr to 70£/kWyr while the cost of CO2 emission certificates is 33£/kWyr in 
the carbon-constrained case.  Hence, whilst energy margins would rise by 18£/kWyr, with the 
purchase of CO2 certificates, the net remuneration for the coal plant would decrease by 
15£/kWyr. 
In addition to the energy sales revenue, both PC and CCGT plants are expected to receive 
scarcity rents during peak periods equivalent to 14£/kWyr.  This reflects the additional 
revenue requirement to ensure that new investment can cover capital costs and, for 
modeling purposes, is equal in both BAU and carbon-constrained cases5. 
Moreover, auctioning will capture the value of emission certificates otherwise allocated for 
free to generators.  Based on a US analysis, Crampton and Kerr (2002) conclude that an 
efficient design of such an auction would not pose difficulties.  Hence, the state can use 
auction revenue to decrease distortionary taxes, compensate those sectors or consumers 
                                                 
5 If new entrants had to acquire allowances from the market this would increase the scarcity rent payments necessary for them 
to break even.  As it is, however, most EU Member States intend to provide new entrants with a sizeable CO2 allowance 
allocation for free. 
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most impacted by price increase, or recycle the funds to other types of energy efficiency 
projects.  (Barket et al.  1993, Zhang and Baranzini 2003). 
2.3 Grandfathering emissions rights 
Toman et.al.  (1998) show that under a Grandfathering scheme, the scarcity rent of CO2 
allowances is passed onto owners of generation companies.  Grandfathering emission 
certificates requires extensive information about past emissions and political negotiations on 
a number of issues including the treatment of new entrants, as described for the electricity 
sector by Harrison and Radov (2002), and the split between different sectors as considered 
by Sijm et.  al.  (2002).   
For simulation purposes, our grandfathered case assumes that allowances equal to the 
annual average of CO2 emissions in the period 1999-2001 are allocated for free.  Table 3 
shows the financial results.   Both plants’ financial position improves markedly when 
compared to the auction allocation approach.  We expect the PC plant to use fewer 
allowances than allocated.  However, whilst annual generation does falls slightly under the 
carbon-constrained case from 5.6TWh to 5.5TWh, given the low level of operation in the 
baseline period, our reference plant remains a net buyer of allowances.  The PC plant’s total 
margin, nevertheless, increases from 12£/kWyr to 35£/kWyr.  In the case of the CCGT plant, 
this increases from 32£/kWyr to 48£/kWyr.  Annual dispatch increases from 3.2TWh to 
3.6TWh, higher than in baseline period and requiring additional purchases of allowances 
over an above the free allocation.   
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Table 3: Net cashflow impact with grandfathered emission rights (2008-2012) 
Pulverised coal plant Gas-fired CCGT plant All figures in £/kWyr  
BAU €10/tCO2 Change BAU €10/tCO2 Change 
(1) Energy sales 
revenue 
117.8 134.9 17.1 131.1 164.5 33.4 
(2) Fuel expense 70.8 69.9 -0.9 95.9 106.8 11.0 
(3) O&M expense 33.1 33.1 0.0 21.7 21.7 0.0 
(4=1-2-3) Energy sales 
margin 
13.8 31.9 18.1 13.5 35.9 22.4 
(5) Net purchases of 
CO2 allowances 
0.0 10.3 10.3 0.0 1.6 1.6 
(6=4-5) Operating 
margin 
13.8 21.6 7.8 13.5 34.3 20.8 
(7) Scarcity rent 13.7 13.7 0.0 13.7 13.7 0.0 
(8=7+6) Total margin 27.5 35.3 7.8 27.2 48.0 20.8 
What level of allocation would have been required to leave our representative plants equally 
well off under both BAU and carbon-constrained cases?  Such an allocation could be 
perceived as a compromise within a political bargaining process (Bovenberg e.a. 2003).  The 
results are shown in Table 4.  Our representative PC plant would require an allocation equal 
to 66% of its baseline emissions.  The profitability of the reference CCGT plant increases vis-
a-vis the BAU case even in the auction case.  Therefore, it does not need any free allocation.  
The UK has proposed allocating emission certificates based on the average of the highest 
four annual CO2 emission quantities during the five year period 1998-2002.6  This will then be 
scaled down by 22% to allow a reduction in national CO2 targets and to retain some 
allowances for new entrants.  If  all existing units, regardless of capacity type, receive a free 
allocation equivalent to about 78% of the emissions of the 1998-2002 base line, we can 
conclude that both types of generators will benefit from EU ETS. 
                                                 
6EU Emission trading Scheme, UK draft national allocation plan for 2005-2007, January 2004. 
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Table 4: Equivalence between auction and Grandfathering approaches (2008-2012) 
 Pulverised coal plant Gas-fired CCGT plant 
(1) Shortfall between BAU and €10/tCO2 
scenarios under Auction approach (£/kWyr) 
-15.1 4.9 
(2) Number of allowances needed to cover 
shortfall (million tCO2) 
2.31 -0.38 
(3) Annual CO2 emissions (million tCO2) 5.08 1.39 
(4=2/3) Shortfall measured as % of annual 
emissions 
45.5% -27.8% 
(5) Allowance allocation equal to average 
emissions in 1999-2001 (million tCO2) 
3.50 1.26 
(6=2/5) Shortfall measured as % of baseline 
emissions 
66.0% -30.6% 
The analysis suggests that the free allowance allocation would be excessive for all basic 
plant types and confirms the result of studies which look at the aggregate electricity sector 
(Dinan, 2003). Burtraw calculate for the US that 20.5% of allowances need to be allocated for 
free to ensure that firms will not incur losses due to the introduction of emission trading 
(2003).  Hence, if industry succeeds in pushing for further free allocation of allowances in 
future commitment periods, then the overall share of allowances allocated for free can be 
reduced drastically.  This would reduce the cost of implementing the CO2 trading scheme, as 
large handouts can be avoided.  The analysis furthermore suggests, that it might be 
advisable to base the free allowance allocation on the plant type.  As the power sector in 
Germany successfully convinced the German government to make the allocation of new 
allowances in future periods dependent on the fuel type (still pending EU approval) the power 
sector has disarmed the previous argument that such differentiation might be discriminatory.  
Free allocation of allowances is a bargaining game of interest groups lobbying for cash 
handouts, and should hence be exposed to more analysis and publicity in order to create a 
counterbalancing force.   
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3 Impact of Conditional Allocation and Updating  
There are a number of reasons why policymakers may prefer allocation schemes where the 
allocation is made conditional on whether a power plant is operational.  Even if free handouts 
of emission certificates to the larger historical emitters of CO2 has disadvantages, from a 
practical perspective, this device can be used to support the reserve margin and hence 
increasing security of supply.  This will be the case if the annual allowance value is large in 
comparison to the annual fixed operating and maintenance costs of a power station.  This will 
incentivise owners of existing power plants to keep power stations open that would otherwise 
have been closed.   
When allowances are grandfathered, the emissions baseline is usually based on a historical 
benchmark.  However, as we look towards future allocations, there may be reasons why the 
baseline needs to be brought forward.  When it is known that the baseline reference period 
will be moved forward to a period yet to elapse, we refer to this as updating.  Knowing this 
information ex ante, market participants can adapt their behaviour today in an effort to 
influence the future allocation process.  In the European context the question of updating 
could involve the allocation of allowances for the period 2008-2012 if these were to be based 
on emissions output in 2005-2007.   
Member States and the European Commission have not provided any guidance as to how 
the allocation of emissions allowances will take place in the period after 2007.  What would 
happen if industry anticipated that emission allowances for 2008-2012 were to be based on 
emission levels in 2005-2007?  This approach can create both inter-temporal and inter-
regional distortions. 
The inter-temporal distortions are best described using a two-period example. Assume that 
the emission certificates awarded to generators in period t+1 are a fraction of emissions u 
generated in the first period, t.  Then the net marginal emission cost c t would be reduced by 
the value of the allowances allocated in future periods, discounted by the time value of 
money or discount factor ß which is derived from the interest rate r according to ß=1/(1+r):  
 ct = pt – ß ·u·pt+1       (1) 
where pt is emissions allowance the price in period t. 
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For illustration, assume the allowances for the year 2008-2012 were to correspond to 80% of 
the average emissions in the five-year period 2003-2007, with a constant allowance price 
and a discount rate of 10%, the effective cost of CO2 allowances in 2005-2007 would be 
reduced by 40% of the traded allowance price7.  If the compliance period on which the 
allocation were to be determined was shortened to the three-year period 2005-2007, using 
the same assumptions, the effective cost of emitting one additional tonne in 2007 would be 
close to zero.  
The appendix compares the impact of repeated updating where firms receive an allocation 
equal to the same fraction u of their emissions from previous periods to a simple 
grandfathering scheme.  In all cases a fixed CO2 emission limit is set and no trading is 
allowed amongst regions.  We also explore banking and non banking scenarios.  These 
demonstrate that parity between grandfathering and repeated updating schemes can be 
achieved when the price of allowances in the latter case is 1/(1-u) times higher than prices in 
the former. The appendix also sets out the implications of implementing an updating 
mechanism after an emission-trading scheme is put into place using initially a grandfathering 
scheme.  
Updating schemes can distort the allowance price relative to the opportunity costs for 
emission reductions. This will result in inefficiencies if allowances can be traded between 
different technologies, sectors or regions that face different allocation mechanisms or 
discount rates, as shall be now illustrated: 
Consider two countries, which are symmetrical in all respects except for the allocation 
mechanism.  Country A allocates allowances for forthcoming period t and the following 
period t+1 on the basis of historical emissions in the t-1 baseline.  Country B uses the same 
methodology to determine the allocation for forthcoming period t but chooses to allocate all 
allowances in period t+1 based on emissions in period t.  Assume that there is no cross-
border emission trading and that each country has to meet the same national emissions cap.  
The price of allowances in country B would rise above that in country A.  If the allowance 
price were to rise to PA in country A, allowances prices in country B would have to rise to 
PA/(1- ß ·u), the level at which the net emission cost would be equal across both jurisdictions. 
If we now allow for cross-border emission trading, market participants in country B would 
benefit from purchasing emissions allowances from country A, raising the net emissions cost 
in country A and reducing it in country B.  As a result, more abatement would take place in 
                                                 
7 40% = 1 – Sx=1,5(0.20.78*0.91x )   Each base year influences the allocation in 5 years, we assume averaging over 5 base years 
(hence 0.2), 78% of emissions of the base years are allocated, and future emissions are discounted. 
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country A than in country B.  This is inefficient; with identical upward sloping marginal 
abatement cost curves in each country, the efficient solution would have been an equal 
amount of emission reductions in both countries. 
The inefficiencies occur because updating distorts the price signals in individual countries 
and trading results in the arbitraging based on a distorted price signal.  One would expect 
consumption decisions to be directly impacted by the allowance price distortions created 
from updating.  As power producers include the opportunity costs and benefits of current and 
future allowance certificates in their pricing decision, they equilibrium electricity price is not 
effected in a world with updating.  However, it will be effected during the period when 
updating is introduced or phased out.   
So far we have assumed that the value of emission certificates remains constant.  This may 
not, however, be the case.  If the forward curve for certificates were upward (downward) 
sloping then ß·u·pc,future >(<) pc,present, and this would aggravate (ameliorate) the situation 
described above.  Even if certificates can be banked, which at the time of writing was only 
likely to be allowed within compliance periods and not across compliance periods, this would 
only limit the extend to which the forward curve can be upward sloping. 
Updating can distort signals and introduce inter-temporal, inter-regional and inter-sectoral 
distortions resulting in an increase in abatement costs for all concerned.  What possible 
lessons can be drawn for governments and others overseeing the allocation process?  The 
choice of emissions baseline is clearly important.  To avoid perverse incentives, overseers of 
the allocation process should make sure that the choice of baseline minimises the scope for 
perverse incentives.  A coordinated approach across sectors and countries participating in 
the trading system would be useful but an easier approach would be to avoid updating 
entirely or implemented this in such a manner that the present value of any future allocation 
be negligible. 
4 The interaction between CO2 and SO2/NOx 
constraints 
The LCPD sets new limits for combustion plants with a capacity greater than 50MW for the 
emission of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and fine dust particles.  Rate limits 
apply to all “new” plants.  For plants that were already commissioned or licensed before 1 
July 1987, defined as “existing” plants, the new limits are not binding until 2016.  Before this 
date each Member State has two options: to implement transitional rate limits on all units 
(Emission Limit Value approach) or implement a cap-and-trade scheme (National Emissions 
Reduction Plan).  Under either scheme, an “existing” plant can choose to opt-out for a 
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maximum of 20,000 hours in the period 2008-2015 after which it must close or install clean-
up equipment that matches the new build standard.  The UK government is most likely to 
choose the cap-and-trade scheme and we have modelled this option.  Under this scheme, 
NOx and SO2 emission allowances will be allocated annually in the period 2008-2015 
conditional on the power plant being operational.  The amounts will be set with reference to 
plant level emissions in the period 1996-2000 and national targets. 
To assess the interaction between SO2/NOx and CO2 policies on the power system emission 
levels we have simulated the development of the UK power market under four different 
scenarios: 
· BAU – as defined above; 
· CO2 only – carbon-constrained case with CO2 emissions allowances trading at 
10€/tCO2 and 20€/tCO2; 
· SO2/NOx only – policies consistent with meeting the NERP requirements as 
described above; and, 
· Combined CO2 and SO2/NOx policies – combined impact of EU ETS with allowances 
at 10€/tCO2 and 20€/tCO2 together with NERP implementation of the LCPD. 
The BAU case still defines the capacity expansion path until 2012 in all cases.  Since beyond 
2012 the model is allowed to optimise capacity expansion and retirement decisions in 
manner that minimises the NPV of system costs, the resulting capacity mix in 2020 will differ 
between scenarios.  In 2010, the results will be based on applying alternative policies to the 
same capacity mix.  Therefore, the 2010 results give a feel for the impact of policies without 
taking dynamic efficiency into account whilst the 2020 results will allow such effects to take 
root. 
Our simulation results are summarised in Figure 2.  Emissions of CO2 in the BAU were 
estimated to be 238.4 million tonnes in 2010.  Assuming a CO2 allowance price of 10€/tCO2 
reduces the generation from coal plants significantly and this is accompanied by a reduction 
in CO2 emissions of 22.9 million tonnes.  However, the impact of the SO2/NOx regulations 
alone is enough to result in a fall in CO2 emissions of 34.4 million tonnes.  In combination, 
both policies reduce emissions of CO2 by 37.5 million tonnes.  A CO2 allowance price of 
20€/tCO2 reduces the generation from more carbon-intensive plants even more and this is 
accompanied by a reduction in CO2 emissions of 37.2 million tonnes.  This is larger than the 
sole impact of the SO2/NOx regulations.  The combination of high CO2 price and SO2/NOx 
regulations results in a drop of CO2 emissions of 41.0 million tonnes. 
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Figure 2: CO2 emissions from interaction between CO2 and SO2/NOx constraints 
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CO2 emissions in 2020 are estimated at 280.1 million tonnes.  An allowance price of 
10€/tCO2 reduces CO2 emissions by 45.6 million tonnes which represents a greater drop 
than the impact of the SO2/NOx regulations alone at 34.4 million tonnes.  However, in 
combination, both policies reduce emissions of CO2 by 102.1 million tonnes.  With an 
allowance price of 20€/tCO2, CO2 emissions fall 101.1 million tonnes, nearly four times 
greater than applying SO2/NOx regulations alone.  The combination of high CO2 price and 
SO2/NOx regulations results in a drop of CO2 emissions of 119.1 million tonnes. 
Our simulation results regarding SO2 emissions are summarised in Figure 3.  In 2010, 
emissions in the BAU were estimated to be 1,551 ktonnes.  A CO2 allowance price of 
10€/tCO2 reduces the generation from coal plants significantly and this is accompanied by a 
reduction in SO2 emissions of 217 ktonnes.  This impact is similar to that of SO2/NOx 
regulations alone, which result in a fall in SO2 emissions of 1,015 ktonnes.  In combination, 
both policies reduce emissions of SO2 by 1,037 ktonnes.  A CO2 allowance price of 20€/tCO2 
reduces the generation from more carbon-intensive plants even more and this is 
accompanied by a reduction in SO2 emissions of only 369 ktonnes.  This is far smaller than 
the sole impact of the SO2/NOx regulations.  The combination of high CO2 price and SO2/NOx 
regulations, however, results in a drop of SO2 emissions of 1,068 ktonnes. 
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Figure 3: SO2 emissions from interaction between CO2 and SO2/NOx constraints 
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SO2 emissions in 2020 are estimated at 1,817 ktonnes.  An allowance price of 10€/tCO2 
reduces SO2 emissions by 399 ktonnes which represents a smaller drop than the impact of 
the SO2/NOx regulations alone at 1,582 ktonnes.  However, in combination, both policies 
reduce emissions of CO2 by 1,720 ktonnes.  With an allowance price of 20€/tCO2, SO2 
emissions fall 1,325 million tonnes, still less effective than applying SO2/NOx regulations 
alone.  The combination of high CO2 price and SO2/NOx regulations results in a drop of SO2 
emissions of 1,791 million tonnes. 
What are the implications of these results for power companies?  The capacity expansion 
path, fixed until 2012, includes LCPD compliance with no regard for the costs of CO2.  Under 
this BAU assumption, if we compare the emissions levels of CO2 and SO2 in 2010, when 
carbon prices are low the constraints associated with the implementation of the LCPD are 
binding on the power sector.  This suggests that programmes designed to reduce non-CO2 
emissions will be commercially attractive (based on a static, short term assessment).   
However, in the same time frame, as the carbon constraint is tightened further (€20/tCO2), 
the CO2 price becomes binding: CO2 and SO2 emissions are lower in the combined SO2/NOx 
and tight CO2 case than under the SO2/NOx constraint alone.  At the industry level, therefore, 
the higher the price of CO2, the greater the switch from coal plants to gas-fired CCGT and 
the smaller the need for SO2/NOx clean up equipment.  Whilst we have not sought to identify 
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this point exactly, our results suggest that there comes a point where the load factor of coal-
fired plant falls so much due to the CO2 constrain that it makes investing in flue gas clean-up 
equipment commercially unattractive8. 
Addressing the long-term result, our 2020 results show that when the capacity mix is allowed 
to vary between scenarios, even a small CO2 constraint is enough to bring about a significant 
change in the capacity mix.  Once again CO2 is the binding constraint. 
Therefore, when considering both 2010 and 2020 results in parallel, given the uncertainty 
surrounding actual CO2 prices, owners of existing plant in the UK may be better off 
postponing retrofit programmes at existing coal-fired plant.  Carbon constraints significantly 
reduce the attractiveness of flue gas clean up investments in favour of developing new 
higher efficiency gas-fired plants.   
5 Costs of Implementing Carbon Constraints 
Our simulation analysis also confirms the view that European power producers are most 
likely to benefit from the implementation of tradable CO2 allowances under the EU ETS.  
Figure 4 shows that UK’s total expenditure of private and industrial consumers on electricity 
(excluding transmission and distribution charges), and hence revenue for electricity 
generators as a whole, increases by £1,840 million irrespective of whether allowances are 
auctioned or allocated for free.  At the same time total generation costs have only increased 
by £60 million as less coal and more gas is used, resulting in an increase in net revenues of 
£1,780 million.  The value of the carbon liability is only £1,385 million.  Therefore, the 
aggregate power sector would be more than capable of meeting the CO2 emission costs 
without any need for free allowances (see section 2 for power plant specific assessment). 
                                                 
8 Although not presented here, this result was confirmed separately by running a simulation allowing the capacity expansion 
path to be endogenously determined throughout the forecast horizon.  Far less investment in FGD, for example, was 
observed in this case than under the BAU case. 
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Figure 4: Annual expenditure on electricity, costs of production and CO2 emissions 
(2008-2012) 
 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
N
o 
co
ns
tra
in
t
A
uc
tio
ne
d
C
er
tif
ic
at
es
G
ra
nd
fa
th
er
in
g
N
o 
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
A
uc
tio
ne
d
C
er
tif
ic
at
es
G
ra
nd
fa
th
er
in
g
N
o 
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
A
uc
tio
ne
d
C
er
tif
ic
at
es
G
ra
nd
fa
th
er
in
g
Consumers Generators CO2 Emissions
200
210
220
230
240
250
Scarcity
Tax
Energy
N
o 
co
ns
tra
in
t
A
uc
tio
ne
d
C
er
tif
ic
at
es
G
ra
nd
fa
th
er
in
g
N
o 
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
A
uc
tio
ne
d
C
er
tif
ic
at
es
G
ra
nd
fa
th
er
in
g
N
o 
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
A
uc
tio
ne
d
C
er
tif
ic
at
es
G
ra
nd
fa
th
er
in
g
£ 
m
ill
io
n
tC
O
2
Fixed O&M
CO2 allowances
Fuel & Variable 
O&M
 
This can be compared to the results obtained by Smith and Ross (2002) for the US power 
sector where it was found that 9% of all allowances would need to be grandfathered to make 
the introduction of CO2 emission certificates equity value neutral.  This may reflect a higher 
incidence of coal-fired power plants and less nuclear than in the UK.   
If CO2 constraints (e.g. 10€/tCO2) are implemented together with SO2/NOx constraints, our 
analysis shows that annual energy expenditure by consumers and hence revenue of power 
plants increases by £2,800 million while variable costs only increase by £160 million.  The 
increase in revenues is far greater than the carbon liability of £1,291 million and therefore the 
sector as a whole would require no free allocation.  This ignores the investment costs for SO2 
scrubbers and other clean up equipment that may well explain and justify some free 
allocation of CO2 allowances.  Investment costs might be lower if, like in the US, reductions 
can be achieved by shifting to low sulphur coal (as were ca.  66% of SO2 reductions 
achieved in the US according to Ellerman 2003) or if plants operate under the 20,000-hour 
derogation allowed for under the LCPD. 
In any case, in future emission allowance allocation rounds it would be advisable to auction 
larger fraction of allowances in order to collect the scarcity rent paid by consumers and use it 
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to reduce alternative tax burdens.  Smith and Ross (2002) use a general equilibrium model to 
show that the macroeconomic costs of the CO2 control program are 80% higher under 
Grandfathering than when all allowances are auctioned and recycled through marginal 
personal income tax rate cuts.  It is unlikely that the money will be directly recycled, and 
more likely that it will be used to avoid alternative tax increases at times when increasing 
capital mobility seems to limit the scope of national governments for capital and firm profit 
taxation.   
6 Conclusion 
Using the UK as a guide, we show that under present CO2 emission allowance allocation 
guidelines, power companies in the EU will be over-compensated.  A far greater fraction of 
available CO2 emissions allowances could have been auctioned in the first phase of the EU 
ETS and should be auctioned in future allocations without reducing the net value of power 
companies’ existing assets. 
Second, we have highlighted the possible perverse incentives that arise when the allocation 
is based on emissions in a forthcoming period.  An updating allocation methodology can give 
rise to inter-temporal, inter-regional and inter-sectoral distortions and this suggest that EU 
Member States should commit to cooperating in defining the allocation methodologies to be 
used for future trading periods, namely 2008-2012.  At best, updating should be avoided 
completely or implemented in such a manner that the present value of any future allocation 
be negligible. 
Finally when considering the cumulative impact of SO2/NOx and CO2 constraints, we find that 
power companies may be better off postponing flue gas clean up programmes in favour of 
developing new higher efficiency gas-fired plants.   
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Annex: Impact of updating on allowance prices 
Usually a mechanism for free allocation of allowances is used to buy-off industry opposition 
to the implementation of emission trading schemes.  This annex examines the distortions 
that updating schemes can have on the price of emission allowances when compared to 
auction or perfect grandfathering allocation option examined.  The auction or perfect 
grandfathering allocation option is examined in case A below.  We examine the impact of 
updating on the allocation of allowances for the second compliance period in cases B and D.  
For completeness, cases C and E present the results on allowance prices and dispatch of a 
continuous updating scheme.   
Let us assume that the total level of emissions is capped, and therefore that the total amount 
of allowances to be issued, Tc, is fixed.  For simplicity we assume a linear relationship 
between marginal abatement costs ct and aggregate emissions T() where the marginal costs 
of reducing CO2 emissions increase as CO2 emission targets are tightened: 
 T(ct)=T0-b·ct , where b >0.       (1) 
(A) Single period 
In an auction or given a perfect grandfathering of allowances, the marginal abatement costs 
ct would be equal the allowance price pt.  By assumption this is the price level required to 
achieve the target emissions level.  Hence,  
T(p1)=Tc,t  
 => 
b
TT
cp tct
,0 -==         (2) 
(B) Two periods, without banking or borrowing 
In period two, generators receive allowances corresponding to a fraction u of their emissions 
in period one. As described in the main text, updating schemes result in generators offsetting 
the value of future allowance allocation against today’s allowances price.  Since no third 
period exists in the model, allowances prices in period two will be determined by the marginal 
abatement costs such that p2=c2. In period one, however, the allowance price is determined 
by the marginal abatement costs, c1, plus the value of future allowances allocated through 
updating and discount factor ß which is derived from the interest rate r according to 
ß=1/(1+r): 
 p1 = c1 + ß ·u·p2  
Combining with the physical constraint on emissions that determines the marginal abatement 
costs (2) gives: 
 ( ) ( ) 1102,1,1 11 cßub
TT
ßußuccp c,optopt +=
-
+=+=      (3) 
The allowance price would be higher in period one than under (A).  With no banking, this will 
not affect the inter-temporal allocation.  However, inefficiencies can arise across jurisdictions 
or sectors if different generation technologies, sectors or countries face different updating 
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proportions u or discount factors ß. In these cases, different producers will take differing 
abatement decisions even if they face the same marginal abatement cost. 
(C) Many periods, without banking or borrowing 
Now assume that players anticipate that updating will occur not only in the second period, 
but that allocations in any subsequent period are based on the emissions in the preceding 
period. To simplify the calculations we assume a constant emission target Tc,t=Tc and 
therefore constant marginal abatement costs ct=c. 
        ( )
( )ßub
TT
ßuc ...  )ßupßu(ccp c
n
n
-
-
===++= å¥= 1
0
031
    (4) 
If the scheme is implemented for an indefinite amount of time then the same formula applies 
to all periods, and the updating will result in a higher price level for allowances in all periods. 
The price level will exceed the allowance price in period one in (B) above. This divergence of 
allowance price and opportunity costs of allowances will result in the same type of distortions 
across technologies, sectors and regions as discussed in (B). 
(D) Two periods, with banking and borrowing 
When banking is allowed, the objective is to achieve the total amount of emission reductions 
over the observation horizon. If Tt is the emissions quantity in period t then total emissions 
are constrained by  
( )å = =-
n
t tct
TT
1 ,
0          (5) 
Substituting the opportunity costs of emissions (1) into (5) gives: 
T0-b·c1+T0-b·c2=Tc,1+ Tc,2        (6) 
Assuming allowances can be banked at no cost then financial arbitrage will determine the 
price path such that:  
pt= ß pt+1          (7) 
As in (B) the allowance price in the second period will equal the marginal abatement cost 
such that p2 = c2. In the first period, the allowance price will equal marginal costs plus the 
benefit of future allowance allocations p1 = c1 + ßup2. Substituting these two equalities for ct 
into (6) and using (7) gives: 
( ) ( )
( )
.
11
1
,
1
1
11
1
21 0
1
21 0
22
21 0
1
b
TT
u/ß
u
c
b
TT
ßuß
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b
TT
u/ß
p
,t c,t
,t c,t,t c,t
å
åå
=
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-
-+
-
=
-
-+
==
-
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=
  (8) 
The results reveal two effects: in the absence of updating, u = 0, and given positive interest 
rates, r>0 and therefore ß<1, the opportunity to bank will result in a reduction in allowance 
prices and marginal emission reduction costs in the first period.  The effect will be increased 
emissions in period one and emission reductions in period two relative to (A).  
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With banking, u > 0, the value of future allowance allocations will increase the allowance 
price in period one and decreases the cost of the marginal emission reduction c1. Thus, 
updating encourages emissions to be switched from the second to the first period. 
If ß(1-u) =1 then the updating and banking effects will balance each other out. Emissions 
trading between technologies, sectors and countries with different updating mechanisms will 
result in inefficient allocation of abatement effort.  
If borrowing is not allowed, the financial arbitrage constraint (7) is replaced by the market 
clearing condition T(ct)=Tc,t. In this case we can envisage three possible solutions:  
· First, when allowance prices resulting in case (B) can be profitably arbitraged by 
banking allowances from the first to the second period such that if p1 < ßp2. Then 
resulting allowance prices will be described by equation (8).   
· Second, where allowance prices in (B) are consistent with p1=ß p2, then case (3) and 
(8) will coincide.  
· Third, when borrowing would otherwise be profitable, p1 > ß p2, allowance prices will 
also be described by equation (3).  
Results from the banking without borrowing case, therefore, encompass those from the 
without banking or borrowing as well as the banking and borrowing cases. The following 
table summarises the impact of increases of the updating rate and interest rate on allowance 
price, cost of the marginal emission reduction and emission quantities.  The reader can judge 
how the binding no-borrowing constraint will affect prices, opportunity costs and emission 
levels. 
Table 5: Impact of interest rate increase r and updating proportion u on key variables 
 p1 c1 T1 p2 c2 T2 
No banking, n=2 u (+)      
No banking, n=8  u (+)   u (+)   
Banking, n=2 u (+), r (-) u (-), r (-) u (+), r (+) u (+), r (+) u (+), r (+) u (+), r (-) 
 
(E) Many periods, banking and borrowing 
Using the price path of allowances (7) and the relationship between allowance price and 
marginal costs of emission reductions pt = ct+ßupt+1 gives: 
 
u
c
p tt -
=
1
          (9) 
Substituting (9) and (7) into (5) gives: 
( )( )å = - =---
n
t tc
t TpubT
1 ,
1
10 01 b                  (10) 
For r>0 and ß<1 and assuming, as in (4), constant Tc,t, the sum in (10) does not converge 
when the number of periods n increase towards infinity. This is because the model allows 
participants to borrow an increasing number of allowances from future periods. This would 
reduce the marginal costs of emission reduction and increase the level of emissions in earlier 
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periods. To prevent such an effect, most banking schemes typically do not allow for 
borrowing of allowances. If we set ß=1 to remove the incentives to borrow, then solving (10) 
for pt gives the same allowance price and relationship to marginal abatement costs as 
observed in case (C). 
